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POST TRAUMATIC "LSION CORPORELLE":






HE PURPOSE of the Warsaw Convention' is two-fold-to
establish a uniform manner to regulate the conditions of
international air transportation and to limit the liability of air
carriers in the event of an accident.2 Despite a desire for uni-
formity, courts have not been uniform in awarding damages
under the Warsaw Convention for emotional injury. While the
Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may not recover for pure
psychic injury under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,3 the
question of whether a plaintiff may recover for something other
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I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw Con-
vention or Convention].
2 Id. at Preamble, 49 Stat. at 3014.
3 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991) ("We conclude that an air
carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a
passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury.").
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than pure psychic injury has resulted in a wide range of opin-
ions, some allowing no recovery at all and others allowing full
recovery in certain circumstances. Far from being uniform, the
outcome in those cases often depends upon how a plaintiff cate-
gorizes her injuries and the strength of the scientific or medical
evidence offered in support of the plaintiffs claims. This paper
provides a summary and analysis of that case law.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION FRAMEWORK
The Warsaw Convention traces its origins back to the 1925
First Conference on Private Air Law in Paris (the "Paris Conven-
tion") and the 1929 Second International Conference on Pri-
vate Air Law held in Warsaw.4 A resolution was adopted at the
Paris Convention to establish the Comit6 International Tech-
nique d'Experts Juridiques Ariens ("CITEJA"). 5 The CITEJA
was compromised of air law experts, with the stated purpose of
"provid[ing] a continuous study of the problems involved in pri-
vate liability resulting from the international operation of air-
craft and to producing a codification of the law incident
thereto."6
Four years after the Paris Convention - when civil aviation was
still in its infancy and international air service was even less de-
veloped - a second international conference was held in War-
saw. The United States sent an observer to the conference, but
did not participate in the negotiations. Mindful of the expan-
sion of the infant civil aviation industry, the conference had two
primary purposes, which were later embodied in the Warsaw
Convention. The first goal was to establish uniformity in docu-
mentation and claims arising out of air transportation among
air carriers serving different countries.7 The second and more
important goal was to limit air carrier liability.8 When transmit-
ting the Warsaw Convention to the United States Senate in
1934, then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, wrote:
4 Andres F. Lowenfeld & Allan Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 498 (1967).
5 CITEJA later dissolved, and its functions have been taken over by the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which was created by the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
6 Overview: Private International Law, Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,021 (Oct. 1999).
7 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 498-99.
8 Id. at 499.
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It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not
only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more
definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but
that it will prove to be an aid in the development of nternational
air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a
more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance
rates, with the probable result that there would eventually be a
reduction of operating expense for the carrier and advantages to
travelers and shippers in the way of reduced transportation
charges.9
The Convention entered into force on February 13, 1933 and
was adopted and entered into force in the United States on Oc-
tober 29, 1934.0 The Convention has been amended several
times," and most recently, in September 2003, the United
States' ratification of the Montreal Convention of 199912 will
once again change the legal landscape for air carrier liability in
cases involving international air travel. Effective November 4,
2003, the Montreal Convention raised the liability cap previously
in effect under the Warsaw Convention and added as a fifth po-
tential jurisdiction the passenger's place of residence. It did
not, however, alter the basic requirements for recovering for in-
jury under the Convention.' 3
The liability structure of the Warsaw Convention is fairly
straightforward. Article 17 sets forth the circumstances under
which a plaintiff may seek damages arising out of an accident."
Articles 20, 22, and 25 relate to limits on liability and available
defenses to a claim. 15 All claims arising during international air
" See id. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Message from the President
of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. 73-G, 3-4 (1934).
1o See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at Proclamation of President
Roosevelt, 49 Stat. at 3013.
1" For a discussion of amendments to the Warsaw Convention, see J. Brent
Alldredge, Comment, Continuing Questions in Aviation Liability Law: Should Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention Be Construed to Encompass Physical Manifestations of Emo-
tional and Mental Distress?, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1345 (2002).
12 See Montreal Convention of 1999 on Compensation for Accident Victims Set to Enter
Into Force (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://icao.org/cgi/goto.pl?icao/en/nr/
pio200314.htm.
13 Id.
14 Warsav Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018. The text of
Article 17 is set forth, infra section 11(A).
15 Article 20 provides:
(1) The Carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures; (2) In
20031 667
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travel must be brought under the Warsaw Convention, and if no
such claim can be brought under the Convention, no claim can
be brought at all.' 6 Article 29 of the Convention imposes a two-
year statute of limitations in which to bring a claim.' 7
the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in
piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that,
in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary
measure to avoid the damage.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 20, 49 Stat. at 3019. Article 22 provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier
for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,200 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the car-
rier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability. (2)
In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability
of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram,
unless the consignor has made, at the time package was handed
over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and
has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case
the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared
sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value
to the consignor at delivery. (3) As regards objects of which the
passenger takes charge himself the liability of the carrier is limited
to 5,000 francs per passenger. (4) The sums mentioned above shall
be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milli-
grams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred
thousandths. These sums may be converted into any national cur-
rency in round figures.
Id. at art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019. Article 25 provides:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provi-
sions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his
part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which this case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct. (2)
Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said
provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances
by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment.
Id. at art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020.
16 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168-69 (1999).
17 "The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought
within 2 years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the
date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
transportation stopped." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 29, 49 Stat. at
3021.
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A. ARTICLE 17: LISON CORPORELLE
The purpose of the Warsaw Convention and the limitations of
liability contained in Article 17 and Article 22 ' 8 were "designed
to assure that only a regulated burden be borne by the air carri-
ers and to afford a more definite basis for passenger recovery."' 9
The Convention's limitation on liability made it easier for air
carriers to obtain insurance and financial backing from inves-
tors, while the recovery provisions also provided some relief for
passenger victims and their families.2 °
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states in the original
French:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre Msion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
l'accident qui a cause le dommage s'est produit d bord de l'agronef ou au
cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de dlbarquement.2'
The English translation, as ratified by Congress in 1934, reads as
follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
18 Article 22 limited liability to 125,200 Poincar6 (gold) francs, which was ap-
proximately $8300 (U.S.) at the time. Id. at art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019. The Agree-
ment Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680, reprinted at 49 U.S.C. App. § 1502
note (1976) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement] raised the limit to $75,000 and
allowed for negotiation between carriers and passengers for higher limits. The
Montreal Agreement was strictly contractual - it did not have the force of law of a
treaty. On September 5, 2003, the United States delivered its ratification of the
1999 Montreal Convention to the ICAO. As the 30th country to ratify the Mon-
treal Convention, the Convention will take effect in 60 days, on November 4,
2003. The Montreal Convention raises the liability cap to approximately
$135,000 with no limits on recoveries above that amount for proven damages. See
Montreal Convention of 1999 on Compensation for Accident Victins Set to Enter Into Force
(Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://icao.org/cgi/goto.pl?icao/en/nr/pio200314.
htm.
19 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 314 N.E.2d 385, 396 (N.Y. 1974) (citing
Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 203 N.E.2d 640 (N.Y. 1964) and letter of Secretary of
State Cordell Hull dated March 31, 1934, Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Conven-
tion for the Unificiation of Certain Rules, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. 73-G, 3-4 (1934)).
20 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 499-500.
21 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3005 (emphasis ad-
ded). On its face, there appears to be very little substantive or contextual differ-
ence with respect to the use of the word "accident" in the new Convention as
compared to the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly, case law interpreting the
meaning of "accident" as used in Article 17, should have the same precedential
value under the new Convention.
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suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.22
B. TREATY HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION
1. Treaty Construction
When interpreting a treaty, courts begin with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used.2 3
Courts use the authentic language text of the treaty to guide
their analysis24 and consider the "legal meaning" of the terms
used in the treaty for guidance as to the shared expectations of
the parties. 25 Where the original text of the treaty is written in
one language only, the text of the treaty in that language is
controlling.26
One way in which courts may ascertain the legal meaning of a
particular term is to consider a proper translation of that term
into their own language. 27 Courts, however, recognize that dic-
tionary definitions may be too general for purposes of treaty in-
terpretation.28 Courts turn, in such cases, to the legal materials
of the country in whose language the treaty was written to deter-
mine whether that country's contemporary legal understanding
and application of a particular term differed from the term's
translated meaning.29 Where the meaning of a treaty is ambigu-
ous, courts will look beyond the written words to the history of
the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties:3 As the Supreme Court explained in
Zichermnan v. Korean Air Lines Co., because "a treaty ratified by the
United States is not only the law of this land .... but also [it is]
an agreement among sovereign powers, we have traditionally
considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and draft-
22 Id. at art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018 (emphasis added) (English translation of Arti-
cle 17).
23 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
24 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397-99 (1985).
25 Id. at 399.
26 See Todok v. Union State Bank of Harvard, 281 U.S. 449, 454 (1930).
27 Saks, 470 U.S. at 399.
28 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 537.
29 Id.
'0 Saks, 470 U.S. at 396; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 259 (1984) (referring to "travaux preparatoires" of the Warsaw
Convention to determine its meaning); Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977); Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, Ltd.,
2 All E.R. 696 (H.L. 1980).
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ing history (travaux preparatories) and the post-ratification under-
standing of the contracting parties."' Finally, a fundamental
principle of treaty construction is that treaties should receive a
liberal interpretation to give effect to their apparent purpose.12
2. Negotiating and Drafting History
Although the negotiating history of the Warsaw and Montreal
Conventions offers no definitive guidance on what, if any,
psychic injuries should be compensable under the Convention,
it does suggest that the drafters of both conventions did not in-
tend that purely emotional injury be compensable. 33 First, the
treaty that became the Warsaw Convention was drafted at an in-
ternational conference in Paris in 1925.11 The final protocol of
the Paris Conference contained an article specifying that: "The
carrier is liable for accidents, losses, breakdowns, and delays. 3 5
Such "expansive provision, broadly holding carriers liable in the
event of an accident," is believed to "almost certainly have per-
mitted recovery for all types of injuries, including emotional dis-
tress."36  In revising the Paris protocol for the Warsaw
Convention, the CITEJA revised this language and introduced
the phrase "en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lesion
corporelle." 7 This language was ultimately adopted by the War-
saw Convention in Article 17.3 Although there is no definitive
evidence explaining why the CITEJA drafters chose this nar-
rower language, it is reasonable to infer that the Conference
adopted the narrower language to limit the types of recoverable
injuries.39
Second, although there is no evidence that the drafters or sig-
natories of the Warsaw Convention specifically considered liabil-
ity for psychic injury or the meaning of "lesion corporelle," it is
reasonable to assume that the signatories had no specific intent
to include purely psychic injury in the Convention because com-
pensation for such injury was unavailable in many common law
31 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
32 Todok, 281 U.S. at 453.
33 Foyd, 499 U.S. at 544-45.
34 Saks, 470 U.S. at 401.
35 F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 542.
36 Id. (quoting Sisk, Recovey for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention:
The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lgsion Corporelle, 25 TEXAS INT'L
L.J. 127, 142 (1990)).




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and civil law countries at the time of the Warsaw Conference.'
Finally, early drafts of the Montreal Convention's Article 17 ex-
pressly included liability for mental injury, included the term
"personal injury," and even introduced the element of personal
injury designed to encompass both physical and mental inju-
ries. 41 However, after deliberations, the ICAO removed both
"mental injury" and "personal injury" from the provision, choos-
ing, instead to retain the original Warsaw Convention
language.42
In sum, historical legal context of the Warsaw Convention as
well as the changes made in the course of Warsaw and Montreal
Convention draft revisions seem to indicate that purely emo-
tional injury was not meant to be compensable under the Con-
vention. However, the negotiating history offers no guidance
for determining whether emotional injury damages can be re-
coverable when they are preceded, accompanied, or followed by
a physical injury.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHIC AND
PHYSICAL INJURY
Previously recognized distinctions between purely psychic and
physical injuries have become somewhat blurred, as the scien-
tific and medical understanding of purely psychic injuries has
evolved. For example, physical manifestations of post traumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD") are reported to include: "neurobiologi-
cal alterations in both the central and autonomic nervous sys-
tems, such as altered brainwave activity, decreased volume of the
hippocampus, and abnormal activation of amygdala, ... hyper-
arousal of the sympathetic nervous system, increased sensitivity
of the startle reflex,... sleep abnormalities .... abnormal levels
of key hormones," impact on thyroid function, and increased
likelihood of co-occurring psychiatric disorders..4 ' The symp-
toms of PTSD may also include headaches, gastrointestinal com-
plaints, immune system problems, dizziness, chest pain and
discomfort.44
40 Id. at 544.
41 Alldredge, supra note 11, at 1369-70.
42 Id.
43 National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, What is Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, available at www.ncptsd.org/facts/general/fs-what-is-ptsd.html




In recent cases construing Article 17, plaintiffs have offered
evidence that PTSD itself constitutes physical injury, citing new
technology that allows doctors "to perceive that extreme stress,
such as a near-death experience or being taken hostage, can ac-
tually change brain cell structure and cause a specific area of the
brain to atrophy. ' 45 As medical technology continues to ad-
vance, it is likely that plaintiffs will be able to claim physical in-
jury for injuries such as PTSD and other injuries that have
traditionally been classified as "purely psychic" or "emotional in-
juries." As plaintiffs' claims become more technologically so-
phisticated, the meaning of the term "lsion corporelle" will
continue to evolve.
IV. ANALYSIS OF "LESION CORPORELLE"
A. UNITED STATES COURTS: BODILY INJURY ON
THE CONTINUUM
1. Recovery for Pure Emotional Injury Unaccompanied by Physical
Injury or Physical Manifestation of Injury
Prior to the SupremeCourt's decision in Floyd,46 courts were
split as to whether a plaintiff could recover for pure psychic inju-
ries. In one of the earlier cases, Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.,4 7 New York's highest court considered the claims of passen-
gers involved in the hijacking of a flight from Tel Aviv to New
York. The claims were brought under Article 17 for emotional
injury accompanied by physical injury. The plane was hijacked
on September 6, 1970, and plaintiffs were held hostage for six
days by guerillas armed with rifles and hand grenades. Plaintiffs
claimed that they suffered "severe psychic trauma" and that they
were damaged "by the physical circumstances of their imprison-
ment aboard the aircraft."48 Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that
they suffered physical injury as a result of the forced immobility,
inadequate sanitary facilities, and scarcity of food and water.
The alleged physical injuries included backache, swollen feet,
boils, skin irritation, weight loss, dehydration, and sleep depriva-
tion.49 The defendant airline argued that the liability scheme of
the Warsaw Convention did not allow recovery because physic
injury, "with or without palpable physical manifestation," is not
45 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
46 F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 530.
47 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
48 Id. at 850.
41) Id.
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"bodily injury" within the meaning of Article 17, and that "the
physical injuries claimed did not result from any impact and in
any case are so slight as not to amount to compensable 'bodily
injury.'" 5 0
The court began by examining the meaning of Article 17 in
its original French and found that there was no dispute that the
words "mort, de blessure, ou de toutes autres lMsion corporelle" were
properly translated as "death or wounding or any other bodily
injury. "51 For purposes of the plaintiffs' claims, the meaning of
"bodily injury" was at issue. The court acknowledged that the
French legal usage of the term lesion corporelle should be consid-
ered, but declined to apply French law to determine the mean-
ing of the term.52 The first step in the court's analysis was to
determine whether "the treaty's use of the word 'bodily,' in its
ordinary meaning, can fairly be said to include 'mental."' 53
The court found that the ordinary meaning of the term "bod-
ily injury" connotes "palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and
excludes mental injury with no observable 'bodily,' as distin-
guished form 'behavioral,' manifestations. '54 Given the plain
meaning of the term, the court concluded that "the compensa-
ble injuries must be 'bodily' but there may be an intermediate
causal link which -is the 'mental' between the cause - the 'acci-
dent' - and the effect - the bodily injury. '55 Once the causal
link is established, the court reasoned, damages sustained as a
result of the 'bodily injury' - whether mental or physical - are
compensable under the Warsaw Convention. 56 The court found
that the airline was liable for the palpable, objective bodily inju-
ries, "including those caused by the psychic trauma of the hi-
jacking," and for the damages caused by them, but not "for the
trauma as such or for the non-bodily or behavioral manifesta-
tions of that trauma. 57
On the other hand, in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,58 the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase "l9sion
corporelld' in the authentic French text of Article 17 encom-
50 Id. at 852.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 855.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 857.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
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passed purely emotional distress. Similarly, a host of trial
courts interpreted the Convention to permit damages for purely
emotional injury.6
Although the Supreme Court had decided cases under the
Warsaw Convention several times before,61 it was not until its
review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Floyd v. Eastern Air-
lines,62 that the Court established the framework for the recovery
of emotional injuries under the Warsaw Convention. The case
was brought by passengers of an Eastern Airlines flight from
Miami to the Bahamas. Shortly after takeoff, one of the engines
lost oil pressure and, as part of the normal emergency protocol,
the flight crew shut down the engine and returned to Miami.
The two remaining engines then failed, and the flight crew in-
formed the passengers that the plane would be "ditched" in the
Atlantic Ocean. As the plane was descending, the crew was able
to restart one of the engines and the plane landed safely at
Miami International Airport.63 The passengers brought suit to
recover damages solely for their mental distress. The district
court concluded that pure psychic injury was not compensable
under the Warsaw Convention.64 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the phrase "Msion corporelle" encompassed "purely
emotional distress. '65 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and the New
York Court of Appeals decision in Rosman v. Trans World Air-
lines.6 6 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, ulti-
mately holding that recovery for pure psychic injury was not
permitted under the Warsaw Convention.
The Court applied long-accepted methods of treaty interpre-
tation, considering the text of the treaty, its context, as well as
the "history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical con-
59 Id. at 1471.
60 See Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1251
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
61 See El A] Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999); Zicherman
v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 218 (1996); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392 (1985).
62 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991).
63 Id.
64 In re E. Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983,
629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
65 F/oyd, 872 F.2d at 1480.
66 See Rosman, 314 N.E.2d at 850 (holding that purely psychic trauma is not
compensable under Article 17); see also discussion, supra section IV(A) (1).
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struction adopted: by the parties. "' Beginning with the French
text, the Court set forth the three part test for determining
when an air carrier is liable for passenger injury: "(1) there has
been an accident, in which (2) the passenger suffered 'mort,'
'blessure,' 'ou .. .toute autre lesion corporelle,' and (3) the accident
took place on board the aircraft or 'in the course of operations
of embarking or disembarking.'" 61 The narrow issue reviewed
by the Supreme Court was whether mental or psychic injury
alone satisfies the requirements of condition two - in other
words, did the passenger suffer "lesion corporelle."' 9
The Court examined the French text and its English transla-
tion. French dictionaries, the English translation of the treaty as
ratified by Congress, and the United Kingdom's translation of
the term all define the term "lsion corporelle' as "bodily injury.""
In the absence of disagreement as to its proper English transla-
tion, the Supreme Court next turned to the French legal inter-
pretation of the text. The Court applied the same principles
that would have been applied by contemporary French lawyers
to interpret the text - "(1) legislation, (2) judicial decisions, and
(3) scholarly writing. ' 71 The Court found that the term "lesion
corporelld' was not in use in French legislative texts at the time of
the Warsaw Convention.72 Second, the Court found no French
court decisions explaining the meaning of the phrase. Third,
the Court found no supplemental materials or scholarly writing
prior to the Convention discussing the meaning of the term "/-
sion corporelle.''73 Since neither Article 17 nor the traditional
methods of interpretation suggested that the term "lesion
corporelle" should be translated as anything but "bodily injury,"
the Court then examined the negotiating history of the
Convention.
The protocol established by the Paris Convention in 1925
would have held air carriers liable for a broad range of injuries,
67 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
68 Id. at 535-36.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 536-37.
71 Id. at 537.
72 More recent French cases have used the term "Msion corporelle," generally, in
the context of automobile accidents. Id. at 538. The Court found that the recent
cases "tend to support the conclusion that, in French legal usage, the term "lMsion
corporelle" refers only to physical injuries." Id. at 538.
73 Although some scholarly writings discussed "ldsion corporelle" subsequent to
the Convention, the Court found the analysis unpersuasive. Id.
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including emotional distress.74 At the Warsaw Convention,
CITEJA drafted the more narrow provision that was ultimately
adopted, although the negotiating history does not provide an
explanation as to why the language was revised or of the mean-
ing of the term "lesion corporelle." The Floyd Court's review of the
documentary record "confirms - and courts and commentators
appear universally to agree - that there is no evidence that the
drafters or signatories of the Warsaw Convention specifically
considered liability for psychic injury or the meaning of 'lesion
corporelle.'- 75 The Court was persuaded by the "unavailability of
compensation for purely psychic injury in many common and
civil law countries at the time of-the Warsaw Convention. '76 "On
balance, the evidence of the post-1929 'conduct' and interpreta-
tions of the signatories ... supports the narrow translation of
'lsion corporelle.' ,,77 After examining subsequent amendments to
the Convention as well as case law from other Signatory States,
the Court concluded that there was no support for a broader
reading of the term. The Court ultimately held that "an air car-
rier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident has
not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury or physi-
cal manifestation of injury," but expressed "no view as to
whether passengers can recover for mental injuries that are ac-
companied by physical injuries. "78
In cases subsequent to Floyd, courts have consistently found
that pure emotional distress is not actionable. In Fishman v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., plaintiffs-an infant child and her mother-
brought an action against an airline for damages sustained by
the infant when a stewardess applied a cup containing a warm
cloth over the child's ear to alleviate the child's pain from
changes in air pressure.79 When the stewardess applied this to
the child's ear, scalding water dripped onto the child, causing
burns s° The crew declined to administer first aid upon arrival,
and eventually, the child was rushed to the first aid station at the
airport and was treated. The court's primary focus was whether
74 Id. at 542 (referencing Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw
Convention: The Elusive Search for French Legal Meaning of Ldsion Corporelle, 25 TEX.
INT'L LJ. 127, 142 (1990)).
75 Id. at 544.
76 Id. at 544-45.
77 Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted).
78 Id. at 552.
79 Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
80 Id.
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the alleged torts arose from an "accident" under the Warsaw
Convention and whether the statute of limitations was tolled
during the child's infancy. Relying on the Supreme Court's De-
cision in Air France v. Saks,81 the court found that the claim fell
within the scope of the meaning of accident as the injury was
caused "'by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that
is external to the passenger.'" 8 2 The court went on to find that
injuries resulting from "routine procedures in the operation of
an aircraft or airline can be an 'accident' if those procedures or
operations are carried out in an unreasonable manner. "83
In an attempt to bring her claim outside of the Warsaw Con-
vention, the child's mother argued that her claims were solely
for emotional harm and, therefore, outside the scope of Article
17.84 Because the claim arose out of an accident, it was within
the ambit of Article 17. In fact, the court found that all claims
for both infant and mother were accident claims under the War-
saw Convention.85 However, because the mother's claims were
solely for emotional distress they were not compensable under
the Warsaw Convention.
In Lee v. American Airlines, Inc.,86 an individual brought a puta-
tive class action under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention 87 on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated passengers on a
flight from New York to London.88 The flight was delayed and
eventually cancelled, and the plaintiff alleged a variety of "in-
conveniences" under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention aris-
ing from the delay. The inconveniences he suffered included:
"(1) having to remain in the holding area without adequate
food, water, restroom facilities and information; (2) having to
stay in a substandard motel; (3) having to 'be subjected' to mis-
information about the flight status; (4) having to obtain alterna-
tive means of transportation; and (5) losing out on a refreshing,
memorable vacation." 89 While acknowledging that economic
damages arising from delay were compensable under Article 19
81 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
82 Fishman, 132 F.3d at 141 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
83 Id. at 143 (emphasis in original).
84 Id. at 142.
85 Id.
86 Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 301CVl179P, 2002 WL 1461920, at *3
(N.D. Tex. 2002).
87 See id. Article 19 provides that "the carrier is liable for damage occasioned
by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage, or goods."
88 Lee, 2003 WL 1461920, at *1, 2.
89 Id. at *3 fn. 5.
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of the Warsaw Convention,"° the court found that the plaintiffs
alleged damages were nothing more than pure mental injuries
arising "from discomfort, annoyance, and irritation" suffered as
a result of the delay."' As such, the Lee court relied on Floyd and
Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.,9 2 and concluded that plain-
tiff could not recover for mental injuries under the Warsaw
Convention.93
In another Article 17 case, Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Services,
Inc.,94 the court reviewed a claim for emotional distress resulting
from a passenger coming into contact with biomedical waste in
an air sickness bag that was allegedly left from a prior flight.
The plaintiff also alleged emotional distress from the fear of
contracting a disease from the waste. Plaintiff alleged no bodily
injury, and the court rejected the plaintiffs arguments as having
no basis in law.95
90 Id. at *4. "Because the Warsaw Convention is premised upon a 'contract'
between the passenger and the airline, courts permit recovery of economic dam-
ages arising out of the delay itself (i.e., rental, hotel accommodation, taxis, etc.)
under Article 19." See Pakistan Arts & Entm't Corp. v. Pakistan Int'l Airlines
Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
9' Lee, 2002 WL 146920, at *5.
92 Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Ainvays Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992-93 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (dismissing claims of emotional distress including anxiety, exhaustion,
frustration, humiliation, mental anguish and physical discomfort arising out of a
flight delay).
93 Lee, 2002 WL 146920, at *5. Under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention,
courts have allowed recovery for inconvenience as a result of delay. See Daniel, 59
F. Supp. 2d at 994 ("[D]amages for inconvenience do not fall within the rubric of
'emotional distress.' Time is money, after all, and the Court finds that the incon-
venience of being trapped for hours in an unfamiliar airport is a compensable
element of damages for delay in air travel under the Warsaw Convention and
domestic law, even in the absence of economic loss or physical injury."); see also
Pakistan Arts & Entm't Corp., 232 A.D.2d at 32 (holding that "[d] amages resulting
from the delay in transporting a passenger are the type permitted to be recovered
under the Convention"); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (holding that Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provided a cause of
action for delay where plaintiffs were "bumped" from their scheduled flight and
the airline did not provide transportation for six days).
Notably, the cases that have rejected recovery under Article 19 of the Warsaw
Convention for pure emotional injury arising from delay have relied on Floyd,
which denied recovery under Article 17 of the Convention based on the meaning
of "Msion corporelle," a term that is not used in Article 19.
94 Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (D.NJ.
2000).
95 Id. at 507.
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2. Emotional Injury Manifested in Physical Injury
Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether
emotional injury that manifests itself in physical injury is com-
pensable under Article 17, lower federal courts have generally
agreed that, like pure emotional injury, emotional injury that
manifests itself in physical injury is not compensable under Arti-
cle 17. For instance, in Hermano v. United Airlines, the plaintiff
brought an action for unlawful arrest, defamation, and negli-
gent infliction of severe emotional distress.96 The plaintiff
checked several bags-some of which contained motorcycle
parts-on a flight from Los Angeles to Miami with a connecting
flight to Brazil. While on board the aircraft, the plaintiff was
approached by a uniformed airline employee and questioned
about whether he had any firearms in his checked bags. After
denying the claim, the plaintiff was asked to deplane the air-
craft, which he did. After the bags were re-examined and no
firearms were found, the airline employee located another flight
for the plaintiff and the rest of his trip proceeded without fur-
ther incident. Plaintiff sought damages for "severe and endur-
ing mental distress and anguish, emotional shock to his nervous
system, and monetary expenditures for medical treatment."97
Relying on Floyd and Tseng, the court found that plaintiff's
"physical manifestations of alleged emotional distress" were in-
sufficient to constitute bodily injury under the Convention.9"
Similarly, in Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., a pas-
senger sought damages for extreme emotional distress, post
traumatic stress disorder, and anorexia.9 During her flight to
London, the captain became aware of a bomb threat against the
plane; it was classified as a "nonspecific warning which could be
related to one or more targets but where there could be doubt
as to its credibility or the effectiveness of existing security mea-
sures.""" In accordance with the airline's protocol, the captain
informed the passengers of the threat, and the plane landed
safely as scheduled in London.''
96 Hermano v. United Airlines, No. C 99-0105SI, 1999 WL 1269187, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
97 Id. at *4.
98 Id.
,., Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 109 (3d Cir.
1998).
loo Id. at 108.
101 d. at 109.
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There was no dispute that the event constituted an "accident"
under Article 17, and the only question was whether plaintiffs
injuries were compensable under the Convention. 11 2 The plain-
tiff relied on a sentence at the very end of the Floyd opinion,
which states: "We conclude that an air carrier cannot be held
liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a pas-
senger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of
. . " 103znjury.
In light of the last phrase, "physical manifestation of injury,"
the plaintiff asserted that her injuries were compensable under
the Convention. 10 4 Rather than claim that PTSD was the physical
manifestation of injury, the plaintiff relied on her weight loss as
the actual physical manifestation of the injury. The Terrafranca
court rejected the plaintiffs argument, relying on the central
holding of Floyd - that a passenger cannot recover absent bodily
injury.1 5 The court concluded that the text of Article 17 re-
quires "bodily injury" as "a precondition to recovery" and that
the plaintiff "must demonstrate direct, concrete, bodily injury as
opposed to mere manifestation of fear or anxiety." 106 Since the
plaintiffs claims of post traumatic stress disorder complicated
by anorexia and weight loss were found to be purely psychic,
they did not qualify as "bodily injuries" under Article 17.107
In Turturro v. Continental Airlines,""8 a plaintiff's pocketbook
was stolen prior to boarding a flight to Costa Rica. The pocket-
book contained plaintiffs medication, Xanax, which plaintiff
regularly took to treat panic attacks, anxiety, and nervousness.
Plaintiff boarded the aircraft, but became concerned that the
medication would wear off during the flight, and asked the
flight attendant if she could disembark. The flight attendant de-
nied her request, despite the fact that they had not yet pushed
back from the gate. After her third request was denied, plaintiff
began to feel terrified. She started to sweat and as alleged, be-
gan to "feel dizzy, nauseated, and short of breath." She had a
rapid heartbeat and pain in her stomach."0 9 The plaintiff dialed
102 Id. at 110.
103 Foyd, 499 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added).
104 Id.
105 Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 111.
106 Id. Plaintiff s psychiatrist classified plaintiffs injuries-fear, anxiety and iso-
lation-as emotional. Id. at 112.
107 Id.
108 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
100s Id. at 173.
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"911" from her cell phone and eventually the police contacted
the pilot and the aircraft returned to the gate. An airline em-
ployee "announced over the loudspeaker that an 'unruly' pas-
senger wished to leave; some fellow passengers then greeted
plaintiff with hisses and jeers.""'  The plane returned to the
gate, and the plaintiff disembarked, where she was treated by
EMS technicians and transported to a nearby psychiatric emer-
gency room."1
Plaintiff claimed she suffered "embarrassment, humiliation,
loss of liberty, psychological injury, pain, suffering emotional
distress and mental anguish."' 1 2 She also claimed that she suf-
fered post traumatic stress, psychological injury and pain, and
that she continued to suffer physical manifestations"'3 after her
release from the hospital, including "insomnia, restlessness, in-
ability to concentrate, and unexplained aching in her arms and
legs."'' 1 4
The court reasoned that, in Floyd, although not expressly al-
leged, many of the plaintiffs suffered what "we may call 'psycho-
somatic' sequelae (such as insomnia or weight loss) as a result of
their acute fear while airborne."'" 5 The court reasoned that
Floyd bars recovery for "physical manifestations" of emotional
distress where the accident causes "no direct physical injury but
rather merely terrifies the passengers (even when the terror
later leads to physical symptoms, such as weight loss).""' 6 The
court determined that this reading is bolstered by the Supreme
Court's narrow reading of lesion corporelle, which respected the
Convention's primary purpose of limiting the liability of air car-
riers and maintaining uniformity.1' 7 The court held that to "the
extent that plaintiff throughout her ordeal did not receive any
physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or any alteration in
the structure of an internal organ, then any subsequent short-
ness of breath, sleeplessness, or inability to concentrate may
110 Id.
1 Id.
112 Id. at 174.
113 Evidence of plaintiffs diagnosis by her psychiatrist was confusing, as she
made two different diagnoses - acute stress disorder and generalized anxiety dis-
order, each with different manifestations. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 175.
116 Id. at 177.
117 Id. (citing Floyd, 499 U.S. at 547).
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safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is not
compensable."1 18
The Turturro court also considered sua sponte whether the ac-
cident caused the plaintiff to develop PTSD. In its review, the
court acknowledged new medical advances that make it possible
to document the physical effects of PTSD, including changes to
brain cell structure, and "that under some circumstances a diag-
nosis of chronic PTSD may fall within the Convention's defini-
tion of 'bodily injury.' "119 While ultimately concluding that the
plaintiff did not adequately plead PTSD, as she did not proffer
"reliable evidence beyond her purely subjective experience of
panic, . .. somatic complaints, ... and conflicting diagnoses,"'' 21
the court's conclusion may represent a significant development
in the ability of plaintiffs to recover for PTSD under Article 17.
The court recognized that its finding might open the "flood-
gates of litigation" unless claims of PTSD are carefully
scrutinized.1 21
In more recent cases, plaintiffs have begun bringing claims
that PTSD is tantamount to physical injury, based on new medi-
cal technologies that suggest that injuries traditionally consid-
ered "purely psychic" or "purely emotional" parallel
physiological manifestations. In Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines,
plaintiffs alleged that they suffered emotional injuries and physi-
cal manifestations of emotional trauma during a flight through
severe turbulence related to a hurricane. 22 Plaintiffs generally
alleged that PTSD, like other stress-related disorders, "causes 'bi-
ochemical and structural changes' in the brain."'1 23 The court
divided the alleged injuries into several categories, none of
which were compensable under Article 17. First, several injuries
were "patently and purely emotional" and, as such, they were
non-compensable under Floyd's construction of Article 17.124
The second category of injury included "manifestations of emo-
tional injury-either physical (nausea, cold sweats) or mental
(nightmares, lack of concentration).' 20 The court found that
these claims were expressly precluded by Terrafranca, which re-
'iS Id. at 178.
119 Id. at 179.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, 232 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D.NJ. 2002).
123 Id. at 322.
124 Id. at 325.
125 fd.
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quired direct, concrete, bodily injury. While evidence was of-
fered to suggest that severe turbulence could directly cause
physical symptoms such as nausea and cold sweats, plaintiffs did
not allege that such symptoms were a direct result of the severe
turbulence encountered by the aircraft. Plaintiffs also alleged
that the mere experience of G-forces amounted to bodily injury
under the Convention. The court rejected this argument, not-
ing that "while such forces may of course cause injury, exper-
iencing them does not in itself constitute bodily injury."126
The Bobian court also declined to apply the reasoning in Tur-
turro, instead relying on Terrafranca and concluding that PTSD is
purely an emotional injury, despite plaintiffs' attempt to re-char-
acterize PTSD in terms of its effect on the brain. However, un-
like Terrafranca where the plaintiff did not allege physical injury
from her PTSD, in Bobian, the plaintiffs presented evidence that
PTSD and other stress-related disorders are associated with bio-
chemical and structural changes in the brain. 127 The plaintiffs
in Bobian presented general evidence that PTSD and other emo-
tional disorders are tantamount to physical injuries, but they did
not present specific evidence such as MRIs or other medical evi-
dence of their particular injuries. Other lower courts presented
with such evidence have allowed the actions to proceed.
For example, in Weaver v. Delta Airlines,128 the District Court
for the District of Montana awarded damages to a plaintiff
whose emotional injury resulted in a simultaneous brain in-
jury. 12 In Weaver, the defendant airline made an emergency
landing during a flight from London. The plaintiff alleged that
she was terrified during the emergency landing and had to sub-
sequently seek treatment for emotional and physical injuries at-
tributable to the accident. 3 ' She was subsequently diagnosed
with PTSD. 31 The plaintiff argued that recent developments in
medicine have determined that "extreme stress causes actual
physical brain damage, i.e., physical destruction or atrophy of
portions of the hippocampus of the brain."' 3 2 Plaintiff also
presented evidence sufficient to meet her burden of showing
"an absence of any factual issue that the emergency landing
126 Id. at 326.
127 Id.
128 Weaver v. Delta Airlines, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999).
129 Id.
130 1d. at 1190-91.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1191.
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physically impacted" her brain, while the defendant did not
raise a genuine issue that the plaintiffs injury was non-physi-
cal. 133 As such, no material issue of fact existed and the court
focused on whether the plaintiff was entitled to ajudgment as a
matter of law." 4 The Weaver court concluded that, because
plaintiffs PTSD manifested as a brain injury, she sustained a
bodily injury within the meaning of Article 17.135 Cognizant, as
was the Turturro court, that its decision could open the "flood-
gates of litigation," the court reasoned that because claims must
be based on a "definite diagnosis of a disorder that arises from a
physical injury that is medically verifiable," there would be no
flood of litigation arising out of its holding.'36
In Carey v. United Airlines,137 the Ninth Circuit distinguished
Weaver. In Carey, a passenger brought a claim against an airline
arising out of a confrontation with a flight attendant. The pas-
senger was seated in first class, while his three daughters were
seated in coach. During the flight, two of his daughters exper-
ienced ear aches and attempted to seek their father's assistance
in first class. A flight attendant prevented them from reaching
their father. The father alleged that the flight attendant refused
to assist him and humiliated him in front of the other first-class
passengers.'38 The passenger alleged emotional and mental dis-
tress and claimed that he suffered "physical manifestation in-
cluding nausea, cramps, perspiration, nervousness, tension and
sleeplessness."' 39 The lower court concluded that the passen-
ger's sole remedy was under the Warsaw Convention and that
the alleged injuries were not compensable. This is consistent
with the holding in Weaver and Chendrimada v. Air India,"' al-
though the lower court in Carey did not require medical evi-
dence of "physical injury" of the emotional injury in order to
sustain the action.
On appeal, the Carey court affirmed the Third Circuit's rea-
soning in Terrafranca that the physical manifestations of the pas-
senger's emotional distress and mental distress - nausea,




137 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
138 Id. at 1046.
139 Id.
140 Chendrimada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see infra sec-
tions IV(A) (2), (A) (3).
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perspiration, cramps, nervousness, tension and sleeplessness -
did not satisfy the Article 17 "bodily injury" requirement.14 1 As
in Terrafranca, the passenger did not demonstrate "'direct, con-
crete bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear or
anxiety.'- 142 The Carey court relied on the reasoning in Floyd
with respect to the purpose of the Convention, i.e., to limit the
liability of air carriers to foster industry growth. 4 ' The court
also referenced dicta in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng'44 to
support its conclusion that the "Supreme Court would hold that
physical manifestations purely descended from emotional and
mental distress do not satisfy the 'bodily injury' requirement of
Article 17."' 45 Although other cases, including Terrafranca, cite
to this same statement in Tseng, the issue of recovery for emo-
tional distress was not before the Tseng Court. 146 Again, as the
plaintiffs did not provide concrete physiological medical evi-
dence of their emotional injuries, the court was hard pressed to
find that the emotional injuries constituted "bodily injury"
under Article 17.
In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,147 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a pas-
senger's claim with facts very similar to those in Carey. The pas-
senger brought a claim for emotional distress under Article 17
based on his confrontation with a flight attendant. The plaintiff
did not allege bodily harm, but alleged that intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress "is not preempted because the Con-
vention does not govern the commission of intentional and
malicious torts that cause non-bodily harm."14 8 The court analo-
gized this case to Carey and held that the "Warsaw Convention
creates 'no exception for an injury suffered as a result of inten-
tional conduct.'" 149 As the injuries were purely emotional, the
passenger's claim was barred.
141 Id.
142 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052 (citing Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 110).
143 Id. at 1052-53.
144 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
145 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.
146 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172.
147 Bloom v. Alaska Airlines, No. 01-55684, 2002 WL 1136727 (9th Cir. May 30,
2002) (unpublished opinion).
148 Id. at *2.
149 Id. (citing Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051).
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3. Emotional Injury Unrelated to Physical Harm
The majority of courts have not allowed plaintiffs to recover
for emotional injury that is unrelated to physical harm. In Alva-
rez v. American Airlines, Inc.,150 plaintiff sought compensation for
physical and mental injuries related to an emergency evacua-
tion. Plaintiff suffered physical injuries during the evacuation,
including bruises and pain. In addition, plaintiff began having
anxiety attacks in situations that were similar to those occurring
just before the evacuation. 151 The plaintiff did not allege a cas-
ual connection between the physical injuries and the mental in-
juries. The court concluded that only plaintiffs physical injuries
were compensable.
The Alvarez court adopted the majority view that in order to
recover for psychological injuries, there must be a "causal link
between the alleged physical injury and the alleged psychologi-
cal injury.' 1 52 The court looked to the Second Circuit's decision
in Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc.153 and compared the
language in Article 25, which required causation, with the liabil-
ity provisions in Article 17, which did not. The court found that
"under Article 17, a relatively intimate link is required between
the liability-triggering event (the accident) and plaintiffs' dam-
ages because the liability-triggering event is not necessarily cul-
pable."'1 54 In other words, whereas a liability event is necessary
to trigger liability under Article 25 (which is necessarily culpa-
ble), Article 17 imposes strict liability for "bodily injury," and the
standard for imposing strict liability should be more stringent.
Contrasting a similar case, Longo v. Air France, Inc.,' 55 where
the plaintiffs alleged bodily injuries (bruises during evacuation)
and related emotional injuries (fear of death), but failed to al-
lege that their fear of death flowed from their bruises, the Alva-
rez court concluded that:
The Convention's goal of 'reasonable and predicable' recoveries,
would be undermined if similarly situated passengers were
treated differently from one another on the basis of an arbitrary
and insignificant difference in their experience. The happen-
stance of getting scratched on the way down the evacuation
slide . . . [should] not enable one passenger to obtain a substan-
150 Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1999 WL 691922 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
15, Id. at *1.
152 Id. at *4.
153 Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998).
154 Alvarez, 1999 WL 691922, at *4.
155 Longo v. Air France, Inc., 1996 WL 866124 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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tially greater recovery than that of an unscratched co-passenger
who was equally terrified by the plane crash. In sum, in a case
governed by Article 17, a plaintiff may recover compensation for
psychological and emotional injuries only to the extent that
these injuries are proximately caused by his or her physical inju-
ries. Psychological and emotional injuries that are merely ac-
companied by physical injuries are not compensable.156
The court found no such link in Alvarez.
Not all courts have so hastily granted summary judgment in
cases where psychic injury accompanies physical injury. In In re
Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana,15 7 actions were brought
against airlines for pre-impact fear damages arising out of an air
crash in which all passengers perished. In allowing damages for
pre-impact fear, the court emphasized what Floyd did not ad-
dress-the question of whether passengers could recover for
mental injuries that were accompanied by physical injuries and
the decision that "there could never be any recovery for purely
psychic injuries." 158 The court pointed out that nothing in Floyd
"states that once [the bodily injury] precondition is met, and
physical injury or death is present, damages for mental distress
are not available."'1 59 The court distinguished other lower court
decisions that have extended Floyd to "create a partial bar to re-
covering for emotional distress under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. '""'  In these cases, courts found that the "emotional
distress claims flowing from the accident (as opposed to some
physical injury sustained in the accident) are unrecoverable."' 16'
The Alvarez court declined to adopt the reasoning in these cases,
where "Article 17 itself expressly requires a causal link only be-
tween 'damage sustained' and the accident." '62 In holding that
plaintiffs could recover for their pre-impact pain and suffering,
the court in In re Roselawn noted that its decision, "which per-
mits those passengers who sustained physical injury in the acci-
dent to recover for any pre-impact terror they may have
experienced, is no more unfair than the rule recognized in
156 Alvarez, 1999 WVL 691922, at *5 (citations omitted).
157 In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Il.
1997).




162 Id. at 179.
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Floyd, which permits only passengers with physical injuries to re-
cover at all."' 3
Similarly, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,
1983,164 the court granted damages for emotional injury that
was accompanied but not caused by simultaneous physical in-jury. Survivors sought damages for pre-death pain and suffering
by passengers on a Korean Air Lines flight that crashed after
being shot down by a Soviet missile. 6 5 The court found that
passengers were alive and conscious for about eleven minutes
after the initial missile strike."6' Acknowledging that, under
Floyd,'6 7damages for mental anguish were not recoverable "ab-
sent physical injury,"' 6 the court awarded damages for the dece-
dents' mental anguish because the evidence showed that they
did sustain physical injury due to rapid air decompression. 69
According to the court, the facts that the emotional injury was
"accompanied by physical injury" and that the decedents' suffer-
ing was "likely considerable" made the case "vastly different"
from Floyd. 7 0
In Chendrimada v. Air India,171 plaintiffs brought an action for
injuries that occurred on a trip to Bombay, India. Plaintiffs' first
flight from New York was canceled due to a bomb scare, and
plaintiffs were rescheduled on a flight the following day. 7 2 The
flight made a scheduled stop in Delhi, but due to weather condi-
tions, the flight remained at Delhi for eleven and a half hours,
during which plaintiffs were not allowed to deplane nor were
they provided with any food. Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered
"bodily injuries" by being confined without food for that period
- including nausea, severe cramps, pain and anguish, malnutri-
tion and mental injury.'73 The court found that the plaintiffs'
allegations of bodily injury satisfied the requirements of Floyd to
survive summary judgment-namely that they alleged a "physi-
163 Id.
164 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.
Mich. 1993).
165 Id. at 594.
166 Id. at 598.
167 F/yd, 499 U.S. at 530.
16" In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. at 598.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Chendrimada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
172 Id. at 1090.
173 Id. at 1092.
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cal injury or manifestation of a physical injury."' 74 The court
concluded that the manifestation of physical injury "need not
result from a suddenly inflicted trauma, but may, as is alleged
here, result from other causes for which the carrier is responsi-
ble.117 5 The court's conclusion, while consistent with the deci-
sion in Weaver, relaxes the requirement that the emotional
injury be related to physical injury.
4. Emotional Injury "Flowing From" Physical Harm
In cases following the Floyd decision, most courts have found
that recovery for emotional injuries is permitted so long as the
emotional injury "flows from" the bodily injury. In In re Inflight
Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching Athens,
Greece on April 2, 1986,176 ("TWA"), survivors brought an action
against an airline for physical and psychic injury arising out of a
bomb explosion in which four people were killed and others
were injured. One of the passengers alleged physical and
psychic injuries. Mr. Ospina, a passenger, seated directly over
the bomb, was blown out of the plane. Expert testimony estab-
lished that Mr. Ospina's body had been nearly severed by the
blast and that he probably lived for five to ten seconds after the
blast and was aware of what was happening to him.
The court focused on the term "dommage survenue'"177 and be-
gan by acknowledging that while the term encompasses many
forms of harm, it cannot include "purely mental injury uncon-
nected to physical harm. '' 178 The TWA court found that the
Floyd decision implied that "psychic damage accompanying phys-
ical injury is recoverable."'79  The court distinguished Floyd
based on the type of mental suffering experienced. In Floyd, the
passengers were terrified, but no one was physically harmed
from the event, while the airline's misconduct1 80 in TWA caused
plaintiffs to suffer "while in pain from his wounds, falling to cer-
tain death after the bomb tore through his body as he was
174 Id. (emphasis added).
175 Id.
176 In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching
Athens, Greece on Apr. 2, 1986, 778 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor., Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
177 Translated in English as "damage sustained." Id. at 640.
178 Id. at 637.
179 Id.
180 TWA's failure to follow established security protocol was found to be willful
misconduct by the jury. As such, the liability limits of Article 17 did not apply.
See id. at 638.
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ejected from the aircraft."'' Because Mr. Ospina suffered bod-
ily injury that then caused him psychic harm, the court found
the award of damages to be appropriate.
l 2
The court recognized that some courts18 3 have objected to
permitting recovery for pain and suffering subsequent to physi-
cal injury because any de minimus physical injury, such as a
scratch or bruise, could give rise to recovery for psychic trauma.
The court reasoned that in this case, the psychic injuries arose
directly from the bodily injury, and both types of injury were
severe. As such, the court distinguished the case from ones
where the passenger first experienced psychic injury followed by
bodily injury or death, and ones where death occurred simulta-
neously with the psychic injury. In upholding the jury's award
of damages for the conscious pain and suffering between the
time of the explosions and Mr. Ospina's death, the court found:
[S]urvival damages for pain and suffering comports with the
main policy goals of general tort law-full deterrence and com-
pensation-without interfering with the goals of the Warsaw
Convention. These goals are compatible-in fact, almost identi-
cal. Both are designed to provide full compensation for harm
suffered and deterrence when the statutory limit of $75,000 does
not apply[.] 18"
In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8 5 plaintiffs aboard a flight
from New York to San Francisco experienced an "aborted take-
off, crash and fire." All passengers survived, but many suffered
minor physical injuries and were traumatized. Several passen-
gers had international tickets, and their sole remedy was
through the Warsaw Convention. Roughly half of the plaintiffs
alleged only emotional injuries, while the other plaintiffs al-
leged emotional distress in addition to minor physical inju-
ries.18 6 The court defined "physical manifestations" as "those
bodily injuries or illnesses (such as skin rashes and heart attacks)
that result from the distress one experiences during or after an
accident," and emotional distress as "psychic trauma that one
experiences either during or after the accident... (e.g., fear of
flying or claustrophobia... or embarrassment about disfigure-
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See Alvarez, 1999 WL 691922, at *5.
184 TWA, 778 F. Supp. at 641.
185 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
186 Id. at 663.
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ment or concern that an injury will develop complications)."' 7
The court found that the failure of the Warsaw Convention to
use the term "caused by" in Article 17 may indicate that the re-
coverable damages "need not be caused by the bodily injury,
and may instead be those caused by the accident."' 8 The court
examined four possible approaches under Article 17 for recov-
ery of emotional distress, ranging from no recovery to recovery
for different types of emotional distress.
First, the court examined the approach that would allow no
recovery for emotional distress, even if accompanied by bodily
injury. The court found this approach consistent with the Su-
preme Court's narrow reading of "bodily injury" in Floyd.189 This
approach, the court noted, would further the pro-industry
objectives of the Convention. The court ultimately rejected this
approach as too one-sided in favor of the airlines, and con-
cluded that such an approach would not be true to the intent of
the Convention, which sought to balance the interests of the
passengers and the air carriers. 1 °
The second approach discussed by the court was to allow re-
covery for all distress, as long as bodily injury occurs, regardless
of the causal connection. This approach, favored by plaintiffs,
would be consistent with a broad reading of Article 17 and
would highlight the absence of the phrase "caused by" in Article
17.' 9' The court also rejected this approach, finding that it
would create a separate cause of action for emotional distress,
and would be inconsistent with the courts' rulings "that the War-
saw Convention creates a cause of action, not just a limit on
remedies."' 92
The third approach examined by the court was whether "emo-
tional distress should be allowed as damages for bodily injuries,
but distress may include distress about the accident."' 93 Under
this scenario, the emotional distress need not be related to the
injury, except that it must "occur at the same time or later than
the bodily injury."1 94 This approach would preclude recovery
117 Id. at 664.
lI8 Id. at 665.
18 Id.
190 Id.
191 Contrast "damage sustained in the event of... bodily injury" with "damage






for pre-impact or pre-injury fear. Although some courts have
adopted this approach, the Jack court found this approach un-
persuasive, but provided very little reasoning for its position, cit-
ing only the lack of usefulness in analogizing to other areas of
federal common law for recovery of emotional distress.1 95
The final approach, the one the Jack court adopted, is to allow
recovery for emotional distress only to the extent that it flows
from the bodily injury. 96 This approach is consistent with the
approach enumerated by the court in Rosman'97 that once bod-
ily injury is established, damages sustained by the bodily injury,
including mental suffering, are compensable. The court found
that this approach would prevent inequities between two simi-
larly situated passengers where both had suffered emotional dis-
tress, but one received a minor physical injury and the other
received none at all. Under the fourth approach, neither would
be able to recover for emotional distress, assuming that the mi-
nor injury did not, in and of itself, result in emotional distress.
The court acknowledged that its approach would prevent recov-
ery for pre-crash or pre-injury terror, but adopted it as the most
consistent with the intent of the Warsaw Convention.198
In a more recent case, In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, 99
the Eighth Circuit reviewed a jury verdict in favor of passenger
damages in the amount of $6.5 million 211 for a claim arising
under the Warsaw Convention. The passenger suffered physical
injury (punctured leg, tradumatic quadriceps tendinitis) during
an air crash in Little Rock, Arkansas.2 1 ' Nearly a year later, she
sought treatment from a psychiatrist for her psychic harm. She
was diagnosed with PTSD and depression, and her psychiatrist
testified that her leg injuries were a factor in her PTSD and de-
pression, although later admitted that the passenger would
likely have suffered from PTSD regardless of the physical injury.
While testimony was offered that PTSD causes physical injury to
195 Id. at 667.
196 Id.
197 Rosman, 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
198 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 668.
199 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, 291 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2002).
200 International Air Transport Association ("IATA") inter-carrier agreements
entered into by America made the action a contract, rather than tort action. The
agreements serve to waive the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. So, while the
action was brought under Article 17, the liability limits of Article 17 were not
applicable, hence the large jury verdict. Id. at 506-07 fn. 2.
201 Although the passenger was on a domestic flight, she was returning home
from a trip to Germany. Id. at 506.
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the brain, no testimony was offered to show damage to the pas-
senger's brain. Indeed, no diagnostic medical tests were per-
formed. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling that any physical injury is sufficient to trigger re-
covery of emotional damages, regardless of their cause, and fol-
lowed what it termed the more "mainstream" view that
"damages for mental injury must proximately flow from physical
injuries caused by the accident. ' 21 2 The Fifth Circuit found that
the approach was "consistent with Floyd, yet provides full com-
pensation for the victim within the bounds established by the
Warsaw Convention. '"203
In its holding, the court drew a line between the emotional
injuries that were directly caused by the passenger's physical in-
juries to her legs and those that were directly caused by the acci-
dent-the damages were compensable in the first case, but not
in the second.2"4 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Octo-
ber of 2002.205
B. INTERNATIONAL CASES
While the United States is the primary source of aviation law
decisions under the Warsaw Convention, 20 6 few other countries
have addressed the issue of recovery for purely emotional dam-
ages under the Warsaw Convention. Those countries that have
addressed the issue almost uniformly adopted the view that no
such recovery is available.
In King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,2 ° 7 the House of Lords dealt
with two cases where passengers suffered psychiatric injury with
no physical injury as a result of accidents on board aircraft. In
the first case, 20 8 plaintiff King was a passenger on a helicopter
transporting workers off of a North Sea oil platform. Both of
the helicopter's engines failed suddenly, causing the aircraft to
plunge thirty-five feet back onto the oilrig's deck.20 9 King suf-
fered post traumatic stress disorder with symptoms such as in-
somnia, nightmares, anxiety, and a fear of flying. He claimed
the accident also caused or contributed to an existing peptic ul-
202 Id. at 510.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 511-12.
205 537 U.S. 974 (2002).
206 King v. Bristow Helicopters, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745, 746 (H.L. 2002).
207 Id. at 745.
208 Id. (citing King v. Bristow, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 95 (2001)).
209 Id.
cer. In the second case, ° the plaintiff was an underage girl,
Morris, traveling unaccompanied from Kuala Lumpur to Am-
sterdam, who was sexually assaulted by a male passenger sitting
next to her. She presented evidence at trial that she suffered
from clinical depression consisting of a single episode of a major
depressive illness. She claimed only mental anguish damages.211
The House of Lords heard a consolidated appeal because the
same legal issue was presented in both cases.2 12
The House of Lords held that compensation could be
awarded for physical manifestations of a mental injury so long as
a casual link can be established by showing that the mental in-
jury causing the physical symptoms itself was caused by the acci-
dent.21 3 However, no recovery is available for mental injury
absent physical symptoms. 214 In this consolidated appeal, the
holding meant that plaintiff King could recover only for his ul-
cer, and plaintiff Morris was entirely denied recovery.2 15
In their analysis, their Lordships turned to the leading author-
ities from the United States. In particular, they followed Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd2 16 and El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,217
but paid close attention Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc.218 Lord
Steyn noted that, in addition to any legal rationale for not fol-
lowing Weaver, the policy reason for not following Weaver was
that "the extension of the Warsaw system to include mental in-
jury and illnesses is too controversial to command sufficient in-
ternational support. '2 '9 This rationale for rejecting Weaver is
important in that their Lordships expressed a strong preference
in establishing international uniformity in Warsaw Convention
interpretation. 22' Lord Hobhouse disagreed and thought
Weaver was correctly decided and naturally followed from
Floyd.22 1 Lord Hope took a third position. He suggested that
bodily injury is that which is capable of being demonstrated by a
physical examination using the most sophisticated means availa-
210 Id. (citing Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Q.B. 100 (C.A. 2002)).
211 Id. at 746.




216 Hoyd, 499 U.S. at 530; see supra note 62 and related analysis.
217 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 155; see supra note 137 and related analysis.
218 Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1190; see supra note 122 and related analysis.
219 King, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 755.
220 Id. at 748.
221 Id. at 783-84.
INSION CORPOtELLE 6952003]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ble. 2  He then stated that he did not think such an examina-
tion happened in Weaver and, in fact, that no evidence of a
physical injury had been presented at all in that case. 221 Based
on these differing viewpoints, the United Kingdom's position re-
garding Weaver is unclear.
The House of Lords had been previously confronted with the
issue of damages for purely mental injuries in Sidhu v. British
Aiorways. 224 That case involved a consolidated appeal arising
from passengers being taken hostage in Kuwait by invading
Iraqis during the first Gulf War. The plaintiffs claimed to have
suffered psychological and bodily injury including weight loss,
eczema and excessive menstrual bleeding.2 25 In the trial, how-
ever, plaintiffs submitted that their claims likely did not fall into
the category of "bodily injury" as their claims were for psycho-
logical injury. Before the House of Lords, plaintiffs suggested
that psychological injury should provide for recovery.226 Their
Lordships regarded the issue as not germane to their decision
and avoided discussion of the issue.227 Interestingly, it appears
that the type of physical injury claimed in Sidhu would have al-
lowed for recovery under the standard set forth by the House of
Lords in King.
Australia has also had the opportunity to decide whether re-
covery should be allowed for purely mental damages. In Kot-
sambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd.,228 the Court of Appeal of New
South Wales dealt with a plaintiff who claimed mental anguish
arising from an in-flight turn-back after an engine fire. 229 Fol-
lowing Floyd, the court held that the term "bodily injury" did not
include purely psychological injury, but noted that the decision
in Floyd "left open the possibility that recovery be available
where psychological injury is accompanied by physical injury. ' 230
The only case supporting recovery for mental anguish without
physical symptoms was handed down by the Israel Supreme
222 Id. at 771.
223 Id.
224 Sidhu v. British Airways, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76 (1997).
225 Id. at 77. The other consolidated plaintiff alleged only psychological injury.
226 Id. at 80.
227 Id. The issue was whether damage suffered in the course of international
carriage by air is governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention. The House of
Lords held that it was and dismissed the case on limitations grounds. See Sidhu, 2
Lloyd's Rep. at 87.
228 Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 140 F.L.R. 318 (1997).
229 Id. at 319.
2 0 Id. at 323.
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Court. 3' In Daddon, the Israel Supreme Court was confronted
with claims by passengers alleging mental anguish damages suf-
fered while being held captive by hijackers.232 The court
reached the conclusion that mental anguish absent any physical
injury should be considered "bodily injury" under the Warsaw
Convention because at the time of drafting, unlike today,
mental anguish either was not actionable or the possibility of
mental anguish without physical harm had simply not been con-
templated.233 This approach has been criticized as impermissi-
bly seeking to develop the meaning of the phrase "bodily injury"
by judicial policy in light of subsequent legal and medical ad-
vances instead of interpreting the Convention as written.234 To
date, no other jurisdictions have followed Daddon.235
V. CONCLUSION
While there is very little disagreement about the literal trans-
lation of "lesion corporelle," its meaning and application in the
context of a variety of mental or psychic injuries is less clear.
There is widespread disagreement about whether - and to what
extent - the term encompasses emotional injury. Court deci-
sions since Floyd allow recovery for a range of claims involving
emotional injury under Article 17; in some cases there is no re-
covery, while in others there is full recovery, depending on the
allegations and the nexus between the alleged injury and any
related or accompanying physical injury. Courts are in agree-
ment that pure emotional injury is not compensable under the
Convention.2 36 Most courts agree that emotional injury is not
compensable in those cases where it has resulted only in physi-
cal manifestations such as weight loss or sleeplessness. At the
same time, most courts generally agree that emotional injury is
compensable if it proximately flows from a physical injury.
The troubling cases are those involving emotional injury ac-
companied by unrelated physical injury, i.e., where the physical
injury has not been shown to have caused the emotional injury.
These cases are typically resolved on a case-by-case basis. There
231 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 770 (citing Daddon v. Air France, 1 S.&B. Av. R. 141
(1984)).
232 Id. at 769.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 770.
235 Id.
236 See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530; Rosman, 214 N.E.2d at 848; Fishman, 132 F.3d at
140; Croucher, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
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is no consistent rule to guide the parties, although the trend in
the decisions seems to disfavor recovery for emotional injury
with unrelated physical harm. Thus, the case law suggests that a
plaintiff is more likely to prevail if he or she can allege and
prove a link between the physical and mental injuries.
In the future, certain advances in medicine may blur, or per-
haps even clarify, the distinction between purely "physic" and
physical injury. Currently, the majority of courts have not ac-
cepted that PTSD alone can be characterized as a physical in-
jury. Defendants should expect, however, even under the new
Montreal Convention of 1999, that plaintiffs will continue to
push the envelope with the backing of experts and application
of advances in science and medicine for more rulings to the ef-
fect that PTSD is itself a physical injury or l9sion corporelle. On
the other hand, although science may change or advance, the
analysis of facts in cases involving a claim of emotional injury is
unlikely to change significantly with the introduction of the
Montreal Convention. Accordingly, parties involved in future
cases with claims of mental injuries must be well-versed in the
body of case law cited in this paper. As discussed herein, the
application of the "lsion corporelle' concept in context of allega-
tions of emotional harm is not entirely resolved and is an impor-
tant area for development of the law in international air carrier
litigation.
698
